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I.

INTRODUCTION

During the 2016 Presidential election cycle, immigration policy
emerged as a key campaign issue, with then-candidate Donald Trump
promising a slate of restrictionist measures, including more aggressive
immigration enforcement, curtailment of refugee admissions, and the
construction of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border.1 President Trump
also infamously linked Mexican migrants with criminality,2 and elevated
select narratives regarding the victims of violent crimes committed by
noncitizens.3 His election, therefore, generated substantial concern among
immigrant communities and their advocates, and fueled speculation
regarding the fate of the approximately eleven million undocumented
persons residing in the United States.4
* Alia Al-Khatib is a staff attorney at Justice at Work in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Jayesh Rathod
is a Professor of Law at American University Washington College of Law (WCL). Thanks to Professor
Lua K. Yuille for her invitation to participate in this symposium, and to Jamila Jefferson-Jones,
Elizabeth Keyes, Kreig Kitts, Matthew Shaw, Anita Sinha, and Yolanda Vázquez for their feedback
on earlier iterations of this project. WCL student Alexis Martinez provided helpful research assistance.
Finally, sincere thanks to Meghan Harper and the Kansas Law Review for their careful and diligent
editorial work.
1. David A. Graham, Has Trump Kept His Campaign Promises?, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 28,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/trump-promises-cheat-sheet/507347/
2017),
(detailing various promises made by President Trump relating to immigration, and assessing the level
of follow-through).
2. See Washington Post Staff, Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid, WASH.
POST (June 16, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/full-textdonald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/?utm_term=.d9f75d3a4f2d (“When Mexico sends its
people, they’re not sending their best. . . . They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.”).
3. See Becket Adams, Trump Gives Mic to Crime Victims of Illegal Immigrants, WASH.
EXAMINER (Aug. 23, 2016, 11:00 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-gives-mic-tocrime-victims-of-illegal-immigrants/article/2600044 (describing a then-candidate Donald Trump
campaign rally in Austin, Texas that featured remarks from the family members of persons killed by
unauthorized immigrants).
4. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 20 Metro Areas are Home to Six-in-ten Unauthorized
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The first year of the Trump presidency has understandably heightened
anxiety among immigrants, given the steady trickle of immigration-related
Executive Orders, along with an uptick in enforcement activity.5 While
troubling to many, the administration’s posture toward unauthorized
migrants is the latest pendulum swing in federal immigration enforcement
policy. The Reagan years saw the passage of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which paired a broad legalization initiative
with provisions that penalized employers who knowingly hired
unauthorized workers.6 During the 1990s, however, as the U.S. economy
expanded and employers sought out low-wage migrant labor, enforcement
of the IRCA’s employer sanctions provisions was lax.7 It was during these
years that the unauthorized migrant population in the United States grew
substantially.8 The September 11, 2001 attacks led to a renewed focus on
immigration enforcement and border control, with an emphasis on
safeguarding national security.9 During the Obama years, immigration
enforcement continued apace,10 while the executive branch promulgated
measures that sought to insulate temporarily classes of noncitizens from
removal.11 The approach has shifted once again under the Trump
administration.
Immigrants in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2017/02/09/us-metro-areas-unauthorized-immigrants/.
5. E.g., Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13768,
82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); see also ICE ERO Immigration Arrests Climb Nearly 40%, U.S.
IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/features/100-days (last updated Nov. 2, 2017)
(stating that interior immigration arrests increased by approximately 36% in the first four months of
the Trump administration).
6. Betsy Cooper & Kevin O’Neill, Lessons from the Immigration Reform and Control Act of
1986, 2005 MIGRATION POL’Y INST. POL’Y BRIEF, at 2–3, http://www.migrationpoliy.org/pubs/
PolicyBrief_No3_Aug05.pdf.
7. Michael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: The
Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 209–11 (2007).
8. See Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal
Immigration in the U.S., PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Apr. 27, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2017/04/27/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ (illustrating the precipitous growth
in the undocumented population in the United States during the 1990s).
9. See generally Deepa Iyer & Jayesh M. Rathod, 9/11 and the Transformation of U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy, HUM. RTS., Winter 2011, at 10 (describing the transformations of and
emphasis placed on U.S. immigration law and policy following September 11, 2011, including specific
changes pertaining to controlling entry into the United States, new emphasis on national origins and
past affiliations, and increased detention and deportation).
10. Muzaffar Chishti, Sarah Pierce, & Jessica Bolter, The Obama Record on Deportations:
Deporter in Chief or Not?, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.
(Jan. 26, 2017),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/obama-record-deportations-deporter-chief-or-not
(presenting data showing an increase in overall removals during the Obama years, guided by specific
removal priorities).
11. See Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar,
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship &
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Over these same decades, as the appetite for enforcement has waxed
and waned, immigration-criminal intersections have solidified and grown
in salience. In the 1990s, the passage of various federal laws significantly
expanded crime-based removal grounds, and placed large swaths of
noncitizens—including long-term permanent residents—at risk of
removal.12 The U.S. government has also aggressively pursued federal
criminal prosecutions for illegal entry or re-entry into the United States,
generating a proliferation of these cases on federal criminal dockets.13
Additionally, the federal government has sought to strengthen its ties with
local law enforcement in order to identify and detain removable
noncitizens who interface with state and local police.14 The merger of the
criminal and immigration systems is evident in the growth of immigration
detention in the United States, with tens of thousands of individuals held
for civil violations in conditions that closely resemble prisons and jails.15
These various structures of criminalization have spawned advocacy and
research focused on the burgeoning “crimmigration” crisis.16

Immigration Servs., & John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to The United States as Children
(June
15,
2012),
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretionindividuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf (announcing, formally, the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program).
12. See Angela M. Banks, Proportional Deportation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1651, 1661 (2009)
(noting that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 and the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 “dramatically increased the types of criminal
activity that made noncitizens deportable and made these deportation grounds retroactive”).
13. See, e.g., Immigration Now 52 Percent of all Federal Prosecutions, TRAC REPORTS (Nov.
28, 2016), http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/crim/446/ (“Immigration remains the major focus of federal
criminal enforcement efforts.”).
14. Two programs that facilitate federal-state cooperation are the 287(g) program and Secure
Communities. The former derives from authority in Section 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act and allows local law enforcement agencies to enter into agreements with U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), whereby local officers are trained and then permitted to perform specific
immigration enforcement functions. See Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g)
Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last
updated Mar. 26, 2018). Secure Communities is a database-sharing initiative that permits ICE to
review information (including biometrics data) regarding individuals who come into contact with local
law enforcement agencies, allowing ICE to identify and take into custody potentially removable
noncitizens. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/securecommunities (last updated Mar. 20, 2018). While both programs were phased out under the Obama
administration, the current administration recommitted to these programs and encouraged the
expansion of 287(g) agreements to new jurisdictions. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the
United States, Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
15. Anita Sinha, Arbitrary Detention? The Immigration Detention Bed Quota, 12 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 81–83 (2017).
16. See Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56
AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (defining “crimmigration” as “criminalization of immigration law”).
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Consistent with the expansion of crimmigration law, the Trump
administration has signaled a strong focus on immigration enforcement,
and in support of this stance, has consistently invoked the rhetoric of
immigrant criminality.17 Although precise answers regarding enforcement
policies are elusive, a January 25, 2017 executive order on interior
immigration enforcement provides a blueprint of the administration’s
approach.18 The order notes that noncitizens who enter illegally, overstay
visas, or violate visa terms “present a significant threat to national security
and public safety”—particularly those “who engage in criminal conduct in
the United States.”19 With respect to removal priorities, the order asserts
that the faithful execution of immigration laws cannot occur “if we exempt
classes or categories of removable aliens from potential enforcement.”20
Accordingly, Section 5 of the order articulates a rather broad list of
removal priorities.21 In addition to those noncitizens who are removable
based on criminal or national security grounds, the order prioritizes other
“removable aliens” who “have been convicted of any criminal offense,”
as well as those with pending criminal charges or those who have
“committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense.”22 In
practice, this means that someone who is in the United States without legal
status (and thus removable) will be prioritized for expulsion simply
because of pending criminal charges or suspected criminal activity. In
short, under the current administration, even the slightest hint of
association with criminal behavior renders one a priority for removal, and
class-based exceptions are discouraged. By adopting this approach, the
Trump administration has largely jettisoned the prosecutorial discretion
initiatives cultivated during the Obama years.23
17. See, e.g., Vivian Yee, Thousands of Federal Inmates are in U.S. Illegally, Administration
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/us/undocumentedimmigrants-crimes.html (citing a statement by Attorney General Sessions regarding unauthorized
immigrants, criminality, and public safety).
18. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799.
19. Id. at 8799.
20. See id.
21. Id. at 8800.
22. Id. One question that remains unanswered is whether ICE considers someone who entered
without inspection to have “committed a chargeable criminal offense.” Though entry without
inspection is often treated as a civil immigration law violation, it is also codified in the U.S. Code as
a criminal misdemeanor. See 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2012) (“Improper entry by alien”).
23. See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The History of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1285 (2015) (describing the historical role that prosecutorial
discretion has played in immigration law and detailing its application to select executive actions during
the Obama administration). Along these lines, the enforcement priorities laid out by the Obama
administration in November 2014 were premised on actual, not potential, criminal convictions and
focused on a narrower subset of criminal conduct. Memorandum from Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Sec’y,
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Although the current administration has signaled a “no exceptions”
approach to enforcement, the exercise of discretion is essential for the
sustainability of any administrative structure, including the U.S.
immigration system.24 Perhaps most important, the absence of any
discretion at the margins will compromise a system’s moral legitimacy.25
Indeed, discretion is necessary to inject some fairness into the immigration
system and to allow for consideration of factors that are otherwise
irrelevant to the application of harsh removal grounds.26 Practical
considerations also compel discretion: even if the federal government
hoped to remove all persons present in the United States without
authorization, there simply are not enough enforcement resources to
accomplish that goal.27 Given these factors, the executive branch will have
to continue priority-setting, notwithstanding the restrictionist, unforgiving
rhetoric propagated by President Trump and other senior administration
officials. These enforcement priorities undoubtedly will be shaped by
policies and attitudes regarding crime-related conduct.
In this context of amorphous priorities and entrenched structures of
criminalization, this article re-engages with a critical question: what kinds
of equities should insulate a noncitizen residing in the United States from
removal, notwithstanding their unlawful entry and/or other basis for
removability? This article draws upon equity theory and related theories
of membership and offers a set of principles to help guide priority-setting
in immigration enforcement. Building upon prior scholarship, it seeks to
Jeh Charles Johnson to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, R.
Gil. Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and Border Prot., Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., Alan D. Bersin, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Policy, on Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of Undocumented Migrants (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_prosecutorial_discretion.pdf.
24. See Daniel Kanstroom, Smart(er) Enforcement: Rethinking Removal, Structuring
Proportionality, and Imagining Gradated Sanctions, 30 J. L. & POL. 465, 482–83 (2015) (describing
how discretion and proportionality have shaped immigration enforcement in the United States).
25. See Jason A. Cade, Enforcing Immigration Equity, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 661, 664 (2015)
(“Any normatively justifiable deportation system requires equity.”); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 703 (2014) (“[T]he deep historic roots of the
modern intuition that some degree of discretion in enforcement is essential to the just operation of
criminal justice and the administrative state.”).
26. Cade, supra note 25, at 664–65.
27. See id. at 664. A recent study found that removing all undocumented immigrants would take
twenty years, would cost the government between $400 and $600 billion dollars, and would require a
dramatic expansion in enforcement personnel and related infrastructure. BEN GITIS, THE PERSONNEL
AND INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDED TO REMOVE ALL UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN TWO YEARS 1
(Am.
Action
Forum,
Feb.
2016),
https://www.americanactionforum.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/2016_Immigration_Update.pdf. But even the process of hiring additional
immigration agents may face bureaucratic hurdles. See Michael D. Shear & Ron Nixon, Constraints
Threaten Trump’s Promise of an Immigration Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/national-guard-illegal-immigrants-report.html.
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articulate with more precision the type of contributions by noncitizens that
should matter.28 Having outlined a typology of contributions, this article
engages with a second key inquiry: How should those contributions be
weighed vis-à-vis criminal conduct, including conduct closely related to
the contribution itself? The theoretical framework offered by this article
does not resolve all decisions relating to immigration enforcement, but it
provides a more nuanced understanding of immigrant contributions, along
with suggestions for how to assess the forms of criminalization that may
be operating in a given case.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Part II describes the
shrinking space for equity in immigration enforcement, and the need to
distill the types of contributions that should insulate noncitizens from
removal. In so doing, this section catalogs the kinds of contributions
mentioned in existing or previous immigration laws and policies. Part II
concludes by describing a set of theories that support undocumented
noncitizens’ claims to remain in the United States, given their
contributions and connections to U.S. society. Part III of this article offers
simple typology of contributions that should matter in the context of
immigration enforcement decisions. This section delves deeper into how
some of these selfsame contributions are nullified by various types of
criminalization, including the invocation by the government of unlawful
activity related, in some way, to the positive contribution. We seek to
untangle these various threads and offer fairer principles by which to
measure immigrant contributions. The article concludes, in Part IV, with
an analysis of some of the limitations of our approach.
II. EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS AND SUPPORTING THEORIES
This section describes how the discretion of officers and judges in the
immigration system has been curtailed by the creeping influence of
criminalization, as reflected in mandatory bars and other obstacles to
relief. One under-theorized aspect of discretionary decision-making is the
weight that should be accorded to contributions made by noncitizens. This
section briefly catalogs the types of contributions that have been named in
laws and agency memoranda, and outlines the theoretical justifications for
an emphasis on noncitizen contributions.

28. As this article focuses on noncitizens’ contributions, the analysis and recommendations
presented herein apply primarily to persons who have resided in the U.S. for some period of time.
Accordingly, the article does not address priority-setting for recent arrivals, such as asylum seekers.
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A. Creating Space for Equitable Considerations
Laws enacted in recent decades have constricted decision-makers’
ability to consider favorable factors, or “positive equities” in immigration
parlance, in the context of enforcement decisions and removal
proceedings. For example, mandatory bars linked to criminal activity have
rendered many noncitizens ineligible for immigration relief. In particular,
the “aggravated felony” category of crimes operates as a bar to many
commonly asserted forms of relief.29 Other categories, such as
“particularly serious crime” and “significant misdemeanor,” likewise
foreclose options for protection.30 Laws have also limited judges’ ability
to revisit custody decisions by mandating detention for a broad spectrum
of noncitizens in removal proceedings.31 Because of these laws, decisionmakers are simply unable to consider the positive equities in many
noncitizens’ cases, including the types of contributions they have made
during their time in the United States.
The operation of these existing laws generates staggering inequities,
as even noncitizens with strong ties and permanent residence in the United
States remain vulnerable to deportation. For example, a long-term
permanent resident with significant connections to the United States can
be labeled as an “aggravated felon” for comparatively minor conduct, and
thus will face likely removal from the United States.32 One common
scenario involves a noncitizen who is convicted for a minor shoplifting
offense and receives a twelve-month suspended sentence. Under current
law, such a crime could be classified as an aggravated felony theft
offense.33 Similarly, a permanent resident can be held in mandatory

29. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43) (2012 & Supp. 2016), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
30. A noncitizen who has been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” is typically ineligible
for two common forms of fear-based relief: asylum and withholding of removal. 8 U.S.C. §§
1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2012). The “significant misdemeanor” category of crimes is a
relatively new category that first emerged with the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)
program. See generally Jayesh M. Rathod, Crimmigration Creep: Reframing Executive Action on
Immigration, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 173 (2015) (discussing the “significant misdemeanor” category of
crimes and its impact on “crimmigration law”).
31. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012).
32. The category for “aggravated felony” convictions alone precludes many noncitizens from
obtaining any form of immigration relief, and includes twenty-one types of offenses, as it has been
expanded multiple times over the past two decades. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43); see also Stephen
Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 476–86 (2007) (detailing the growth of immigration-related crimes and
immigration consequences of criminal convictions).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2012). The categorical approach would govern whether a
conviction under a particular state shoplifting statute is properly classified as an aggravated felony.
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immigration detention for a decades-old criminal conviction, even though
they have already served their criminal sentence, and they are not a danger
to the community or a flight risk.34 In these cases, the consideration of
individualized, positive equities is usually not possible.35
Apart from highlighting the inequity in the immigration system, these
provisions illustrate the impact that systems of criminalization have had
on U.S. immigration processes. Immigration adjudicators place heavy
emphasis on criminal conduct and on administrative violations, such as
entering without inspection, that can also be prosecuted as crimes. As
noted above, this growing criminal-immigration nexus is not a new
phenomenon and has generated a significant body of literature. Many
scholars have examined how criminal conduct is framed as a basis for
enforcement in immigration law36 and how it relates to theories of
membership more generally.37
Researchers and scholars have also examined the salience of race in
criminal-immigration processes. As numerous observers have explained,
the criminal justice system disproportionately impacts people of color and
those with limited financial resources.38 At the federal level, immigration
crimes, such as illegal re-entry, make up fifty percent of the federal
criminal docket.39 These prosecutions disproportionately impact Latino
See, e.g., Omargharib v. Holder, 775 F.3d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Descamps v. United States,
570 U.S. 254, 260–66 (2014)).
34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (mandating detention of noncitizens convicted of certain offenses).
35. The inherent inequity in these systems has prompted litigation challenges, but few of these
efforts have been successful. Advocates have successfully chipped away at the mandatory detention
provision. For example, the Ninth Circuit ruled that bond hearings are required after six months in
detention. Rodriguez v. Robbins, 804 F.3d 1060, 1078–86, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015) rev’d, Jennings v.
Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830 (2018). Other circuits have also articulated limitations, without adopting a
specific timeframe. See Sopo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 825 F.3d 1199, 1213–17 (11th Cir. 2016); Diop
v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 235 (3d Cir. 2011).
36. See, e.g., Allegra M. McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and its Possible
Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 105, 125–28 (2012) (discussing immigration enforcement’s
justification for its emphasis on noncitizens with criminal convictions); Legomsky, supra note 32, at
473 (arguing that the importation of the criminal justice model into immigration law has been
asymmetric in its embrace of enforcement components without the corresponding procedural
protections); Stumpf, supra note 16, at 382–87 (2006) (explaining three aspects of the intersections of
criminal and immigration law: the expansion of criminal grounds for deportation and exclusion of
noncitizens; growing use of criminal punishment based on immigration grounds; and focus on
detention and deportation of noncitizens likely to commit crimes that pose a national security threat).
37. See, e.g., Linda Kelly, Defying Membership: The Evolving Role of Immigration
Jurisprudence, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 185 (1998) (arguing that forms of membership are gaining increased
significance in immigration law).
38. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (1st ed. 2010); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1st ed. 1999).
39. See Immigration Now 52 Percent of All Federal Criminal Prosecutions, supra note 13
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communities, thus “feed[ing] the erroneous but rampant perception that
immigrants have a higher propensity to commit crimes.”40 Moreover, at
the state and local levels, the same tools—such as racially disparate
policing—that plague the criminal justice system, create the same racial
imbalance for noncitizens funneled into immigration proceedings because
of police stops, arrests, and criminal convictions.41 Enforcement activities
by federal immigration agents also display evidence of racial profiling and
bias.42
Notwithstanding the inflexibility and bias in the system, there remain
some areas where the government can exercise discretion. In those cases
where criminal or administrative violations do not pose an absolute bar,
adjudicators can often consider positive equities. Most commonly, these
factors or equities are framed as connections to the United States—
duration of presence in the country, family ties within the United States,
and property ownership.43 The length of one’s stay in the United States is
a commonly invoked justification for permitting someone to remain in the
country, particularly when the individual has been in the United States
since childhood and effectively knows no other home.44 This criterion also
hearkens to other bodies of law, where claims or defenses ripen after
specified periods of time.45 Various provisions of immigration law also
(finding that, in fiscal year 2016, criminal prosecutions for immigration violations, such as illegal reentry, made up fifty-two percent of all federal prosecutions).
40. Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR
135, 146 (2009).
41. A quintessential example is racial profiling by local law enforcement officers who embrace
cooperation with federal immigration enforcement authorities. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings on Discriminatory Policing in
Maricopa County (Dec. 15, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2011/12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojsfindings-discriminatory-policing-maricopa-county (concluding that the Maricopa County Sheriff’s
Office, led by Joe Arpaio, engaged in a practice of racially profiling Latino residents).
42. Some of this behavior is enabled by judicial precedent that permits the consideration of race
in border enforcement. See César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández, La Migra in the Mirror:
Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 167, 179–89 (2009).
43. Such factors are considered positive equities in cancellation of removal cases. See In re CV-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998) (discussing favorable considerations accounted for when
considering requests for cancellation of removal).
44. Id. Indeed, the DACA program was explicitly framed as a discretionary act for certain
individuals who met durational presence requirements. See Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The
Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 94–96 (2016).
45. An obvious comparison would be a statute of limitations, which forecloses the opportunity
to bring suit after a specified period of time. Various observers have argued for a similar statute of
limitations to apply to deportation. See, e.g., Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim, Deportation Deadline, 95
WASH. U. L. REV. 531 (2017) (discussing the abnormalities between the procedures in immigration
law and non-immigration law, and proposing the use of a statute of limitations in deportation
proceedings); Mae M. Ngai, We Need a Deportation Deadline, WASH. POST (June 14, 2005),
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place significant emphasis on the presence of U.S. citizen or permanent
resident family members, and consider the hardship that these relatives
may face if the noncitizen were removed from the country.46
Although various scholars have explored the salience of connections
to the United States,47 there is surprisingly little theorizing about
contributions that noncitizens make, and how these contributions should
be weighed when making decisions about removal. While few would
dispute that significant contributions to the United States should be a
relevant factor, there is a lack of clarity and consensus regarding the types
of contributions that militate in favor of discretionary immigration relief.
The project of defining these contributions, and defending them
theoretically, is critical to the effort of injecting more equity into the
immigration system. Without a firm, theoretically grounded articulation
of which positive equities matter, discourses of criminality will continue
to erode the limited terrain of discretion.
In Part III of this article, we present a simple typology of contributions
that should guide discretionary decision-making in immigration cases. As
a preliminary step, however, we review the types of contributions deemed
relevant in existing or previous laws and policies guiding administrative
discretion for persons who are removable. Broadly, they can be divided
into two categories: general contributions or service to the community, and
specific types of contributions to the state. For the first category, in the
context of an application for cancellation of removal, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has specified that “evidence of value and
service to the community” is a positive equity that should be weighed
when deciding whether to exercise discretion favorably.48 Along these
lines, a June 2011 memorandum by former Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton noted that a noncitizen’s “ties
and contributions to the community” should be considered when deciding
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/13/AR2005061301460.html
(proposing that a statute of limitations in unauthorized presence prosecutions as “consistent with basic
legal and moral principles”). Another analog is the concept of adverse possession in property law,
whereby property rights accrue after land is occupied for a fixed period of time. See 142 AM. JUR.
PROOF OF FACTS 3D 349 Acquisition of Title to Property By Adverse Possession § 1 (2014).
46. The Immigration and Nationality Act contains various waiver provisions that examine
potential hardships to U.S. citizens or lawful permanent resident family members. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(h)–(i) (2012).
47. See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 18, 54 (2006) (describing the concept of
“immigration as affiliation”); Elizabeth Keyes, Defining American: The DREAM Act, Immigration
Reform and Citizenship, 14 Nev. L.J. 101, 124 (describing ways to frame the membership claims of
DREAMers, based on their connections to the country).
48. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. at 11.
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whether to exercise prosecutorial discretion.49 These criteria are stated in
very broad terms, and thus provide limited guidance. That said, one type
of contribution that is specifically mentioned for cancellation of removal
applicants is a history of employment.50
The second category of contributions deemed important are those that
benefit the state in some fashion. First, government memos and case law
consistently mention military service in the United States as a factor
supporting an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. For example, a
November 2000 memorandum from Immigration & Naturalization
Service (INS) Commissioner Doris Meissner specifies that “[m]ilitary
service with an honorable discharge should be considered as a favorable
factor.”51 Military service is similarly named as a positive equity in the
2011 Morton Memo, and in the factors that support cancellation of
removal.52 The U.S. government has also considered support of other law
enforcement functions to be a positive contribution weighing in the
noncitizen’s favor. The Meissner Memo states that “[c]urrent or past
cooperation with the INS or other law enforcement authorities, such as the
U.S. Attorneys, the Department of Labor, or National Labor Relations
In his
Board, among others, weighs in favor of discretion.”53
memorandum on prosecutorial discretion, ICE Director Morton adopted
nearly identical language.54 In a memo issued contemporaneously,
Director Morton also instructed ICE personnel to “exercise all appropriate
discretion” in cases that involve “individuals pursuing legitimate civil
rights complaints” and “individuals engaging in a protected activity
related to civil or other rights.”55 The language in these memos is
49. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field
Officer Dirs., Special Agents in Charge, & Chief Counsel, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion
Consistent
with
Immigration
Enforcement
Priorities
4
(June
17,
2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-discretion-memo.pdf [hereinafter
Morton Memo].
50. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. at 11.
51. Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Dir., Immigration & Naturalization Serv., to Reg’l Dirs.,
Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, & Reg’l & Dist. Counsel, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion 8
(Nov. 17, 2000), http://library.niwap.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/IMM-Memo-ProsDiscretion.pdf
[hereinafter Meissner Memo].
52. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. at 11 (stating that “service in this country’s armed forces” is a
relevant positive equity for cancellation of removal); Morton Memo, supra note 49, at 5 (categorizing
“veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces” as a category meriting “particular care and
consideration” when reviewing requests for prosecutorial discretion).
53. Meissner Memo, supra note 51, at 8.
54. Morton Memo, supra note 49, at 4 (“[T]he person is currently cooperating or has cooperated
with federal, state or local law enforcement authorities, such as ICE, the U.S Attorneys or Department
of Justice, the Department of Labor, or National Labor Relations Board, among others.”).
55. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, to All Field
Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge, & Chief Counsel, on Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain
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consistent with S, T, and U nonimmigrant visa relief, which reward
individuals for cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and
prosecute criminal activity.56
Although this precedent provides some helpful markers, the ambiguity
allows space to reimagine the types of contributions that decision-makers
should weigh favorably. Moreover, the relatively sparse precedent allows
us to move beyond traditional, neoliberal conceptions of worthiness that
privilege economic productivity and cultural assimilation by noncitizens,
and instead consider a wider swath of contributions.57 For any vision of
positive equities to be sustainable, however, strong theoretical foundations
must support it. The subsection below details the theories of equity and
membership that support consideration of a broad range of contributions
by noncitizens.
B. Theoretical Underpinnings
Scholars have advanced various theories to explain why noncitizens
have membership claims that should allow them to remain in the United
States. Most of these theories equate membership with a more lasting
status, such as lawful permanent residence or citizenship.58 The focus of
this article, however, is on the considerations that should guide
enforcement decisions, which can often take the form of a discretionary,
and temporary, reprieve from removal. Permanent membership is, of
course, substantively and procedurally distinct from a discretionary
enforcement decision,59 and as a policy matter, one could easily justify
distinct standards for the two. Nevertheless, these membership theories
serve as a useful point of departure for the present analysis, as they
consider factors that undergird a right to remain in the United States. An
examination (and adaptation) of these theories reveals why it makes sense
Victims, Witnesses, and Plaintiffs 2 (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/prosecutorialdiscretion/certain-victims-witnesses-plaintiffs.pdf. Note, however, that the memorandum does not
explicitly frame this activity as a “contribution.” A reasonable reading of the memorandum is that
ICE intended to recognize that these activities should not be undermined and were thus worthy of a
temporary reprieve from immigration enforcement.
56. See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(S)–(U) (2012 & Supp. 2016).
57. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 261
(2017) (arguing, that in earned citizenship discourses, “worthiness is measured by economic
productivity and moral rectitude”).
58. See infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
59. Lawful permanent residence is a formal legal status in the United States and is accompanied
by specific substantive and procedural rights in the immigration context and in other areas of law. By
contrast, a discretionary enforcement decision can be as simple as refraining from initiating removal
proceedings against an undocumented noncitizen, thereby allowing that noncitizen to remain in the
United States without authorization.
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to focus on noncitizens’ contributions to the country as a way to inject
more equity into the immigration system. Valuing contributions has
intuitive appeal, but these theories illustrate the deeper relevance of this
approach.
Before delving into any specific theory, it is worth acknowledging the
moral dimensions of equity. Consideration of equity—that is, of
fundamental fairness in social relationships, including relationships
between individuals and institutional actors—is justified on moral
grounds.60 Equity is also critical for the sustainability and legitimacy of
any system of adjudication.61 As Henry E. Smith observes, “[e]quity
benefits from basic morality to the extent that it is based on widely known
and shared morals.”62 In the immigration context, equitable considerations
can allow these everyday notions of fairness to temper otherwise rigid
grounds of removal.63
Turning to specific theories, one widely discussed theory regarding
the membership claims of noncitizens is jus nexi, advanced by Ayelet
Shachar.64 In her work, Shachar builds upon the most common theoretical
justifications for citizenship: jus soli (citizenship through birth in the
country’s territory) and jus sanguinis (citizenship through family
relationships).65 These conceptions of citizenship provide an automatic
claim for membership in different legal systems, but necessarily exclude
large swaths of individuals who may be residing in a country’s territory.66
Shachar introduces a new basis for a membership claim, beyond territorial
birth or inherited citizenship: substantial connections to the country.67
Shachar therefore offers the phrase jus nexi as a way to describe this new
legal principle that could underlie a membership claim.68

60. Duane Rudolph, Workers, Dignity, and Equitable Tolling, 15 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 126, 140
(2017).
61. Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV. 429,
505 (2003).
62. Henry E. Smith, The Equitable Dimension of Contract, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 897, 913
(2012).
63. See M. Isabel Medina, Judicial Review – A Nice Thing? Article III, Separation of Powers
and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1525, 1534–39 (1997) (describing attempts to harmonize inflexible removal provisions with
considerations of fairness and moral legitimacy).
64. Ayelet Shachar, Earned Citizenship: Property Lessons for Immigration Reform, 23 YALE. J.
L. & HUMAN. 110, 115 (2011).
65. See generally id.
66. Id. at 118–19.
67. Id. at 113–14 (discussing “rootedness” as the new framework for earned citizenship).
68. Id. at 115.
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Shachar’s theory emphasizes rootedness and connections as a
justification for awarding earned citizenship. According to Shachar, “jus
nexi demands that we focus on the ‘actual relationships the individual has
developed with a society: a family, friends, a job, association membership,
professional acquaintances, opportunities.’”69 Although it is framed in
terminology related to citizenship, the jus nexi principle can also operate
to confer permanent residence, a lesser status, or even to offer a simple
reprieve from removal.70 While on a theoretical basis, jus nexi may equate
with full membership, political realities might prevent conferral of
citizenship. Therefore, insofar as jus nexi connotes a right to remain, it
has relevance for the sizeable undocumented population in the United
States, and whether some undocumented noncitizens should be insulated
from expulsion.71
One potential shortcoming of Shachar’s jus nexi principle is its limited
exposition of the kinds of contributions that noncitizens can make.
Shachar describes different dimensions of rootedness and types of social
connections, many of which could serve as a reasonable proxy for
contributions.72 Shachar’s article does mention employment, and
acknowledges that the “ties that bind . . . may include instances of civic
engagement, such as being an active parent in a child’s school,
volunteering for community service, or caring for a needy relative.”73
While these can certainly be classified as contributions, the range of
noncitizen contributions is much broader, and sometimes occurs without
other substantial ties to the United States. We therefore suggest a variant
on the jus nexi model, which we call jus nexi et contributionum. This
applies the same principles of jus nexi—that membership claims are based
on substantial connections to, and rootedness in, the United States—and
expands it slightly to include a more explicit focus on substantial
contributions to the country.74 We contend that it is important to look not
only to rootedness, but to the nature of the contributions that one makes to

69. Id. at 137 (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Aliens, Due Process and ‘Community Ties’: A
Response to Martin, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 244 (1983)).
70. Id. at 155–56.
71. Angela M. Banks, The Normative and Historical Cases for Proportional Deportation, 62
EMORY L.J. 1243, 1253 (2013).
72. Shachar, supra note 64, at 137–39.
73. Id. at 134.
74. This framing builds upon the concept of “immigration as affiliation” advanced by Hiroshi
Motomura, Who Belongs?: Immigration Outside the Law and the Idea of Americans in Waiting, 2
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359, 376 (2012). Like jus nexi, “immigration as affiliation” is premised on ties
to the United States, but Motomura also includes contributions such as employment, payment of taxes,
and civic engagement. Id.
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society. Substantial contributions, moreover, can compensate for fewer
links to the country, and vice-versa.
Other theories help illustrate why the government should value
contributions by noncitizens when making decisions regarding removal
priorities. One is equity theory, which has birthed a strand of literature
exploring inequity in social exchange. These works explore how
imbalances in relationships lead to corresponding behavior change on the
part of the actors.75 Although the foundational articles focus on
employment relationships,76 the principles have been applied more
broadly.77 The basic premise of equity theory is that persons engaged in
relationships of social exchange (for example, employees working at a
company) will assess their outcomes, along with corresponding inputs
made, and modulate their behavior or perspective accordingly.78 Behavior
change can also come about when similarly situated individuals
experience the same outcomes for differing inputs. In the employment
context, if two workers continue to receive the same wages (outcomes) for
noticeably different levels of productivity (their inputs), over time, the
more productive worker may choose to diminish her productivity, or even
leave the position entirely, since she accrues no marginal benefit from her
high input.79 In essence, the theory assumes that persons are motivated by
concerns regarding distributive justice.
Equity theory has its limitations, of course, and does not capture all of
the forces that guide human behavior. Indeed, an entire body of theory on
procedural justice looks beyond outcomes to fairness of procedures and
treatment.80 But equity theory does have value for understanding how
persons make decisions around inputs and outcomes in the context of
relationships. Accordingly, we offer that equity theory can be extended to
the relationship between noncitizens and the state. Noncitizens provide
75. See generally J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL
SOC. PSYCHOL. 267 (1965); J. Stacy Adams, Toward an Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL
& SOC. PSYCH. 422 (1963) [hereinafter Understanding of Inequity]; Paul S. Goodman & Abraham
Friedman, An Examination of Adams’ Theory of Inequity, 16 ADMIN. SCI. QUARTERLY 271 (1971).
76. See generally supra note 75.
77. Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
476, 507 (2000) (“By the late 1970s, equity theory had developed into a general psychological theory
of justice, broadly used to explain subjective perceptions of distributive fairness across a wide variety
of interaction contexts.”).
78. Understanding of Inequity, supra note 75, at 427–28.
79. Id.; see also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 445, 458 (1994).
80. See, e.g., Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized
Migration, 62 UCLA L. REV. 622, 667–69 (2015) (describing two types of procedural justice in the
immigration system—fair decision-making and fair interpersonal treatment).

966

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 66

various kinds of inputs in society, including employment, and other
economic and social contributions. In exchange, the state reciprocates by
offering some type of legal status that permits the noncitizen to remain in
the United States. For those noncitizens lacking legal status, the
noncitizen and the state may be parties to an implicit social contract in
which the state agrees to forgo immigration enforcement (and thus
exercise discretion favorably) in exchange for consistent economic
contributions and no significant social disruptions (i.e., abstention from
criminal activity). Hiroshi Motomura’s formulation of “immigration as
contract” contemplates these kinds of tacit reciprocal expectations shared
between noncitizens and the state.81
Certainly, various factors complicate the application of equity theory
to noncitizens, particularly those who are undocumented. One could argue
that noncitizens understand themselves to be in a distinct class, and
therefore, comparisons around outcomes would be made only with fellow
noncitizens, who may experience similar treatment.82 Additionally,
although equity theory suggests that actors in a relationship will modulate
their behavior if the input-output ratio becomes skewed, noncitizens may
have fairly low expectations regarding outcomes, especially in the current
political moment. Indeed, various factors may lead a noncitizen to remain
in the U.S. and to contribute economically and otherwise—even with the
looming specter of immigration enforcement, and with little expectation
that the government will uphold its end of the implicit bargain.83 All that
said, one can still imagine a scenario where the state places such little value
on the contributions that noncitizens make, or where the contributions
involve putting oneself at risk, that the inequity in the relationship
becomes unsustainable. In such a scenario, noncitizens may cease making
contributions, withdraw from the community, or even depart the United
States and relocate to a different country. To be sure, the government may
have the objective of encouraging people (especially the undocumented)
to disengage from the community or leave the country. This approach is

81. Motomura, supra note 74, at 373–74.
82. Adams suggested that one way individuals may respond to perceived inequity is to “change
his referent Other” and instead draw comparisons with someone more similar. Understanding of
Inequity, supra note 75, at 429.
83. Cf. Jayesh M. Rathod, Danger and Dignity: Immigrant Day Laborers and Occupational Risk,
46 SETON HALL L. REV. 813, 862–63 (2016) (describing how economic insecurity leads immigrants
to remain in unsafe, exploitative conditions of work); Gray Albert Abarca & Susan Bibler Coutin,
Sovereign Intimacies: The Lives of Documents Within U.S. State-Noncitizen Relationships, 45 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 7, 8–9 (2018) (describing the complex relationship between noncitizens and the state,
including the vulnerability of noncitizens to abuse and mistreatment, at times mediated by acts of
“administrative grace”).
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unlikely to be sustainable on a large scale given U.S. society’s significant
economic and social dependence on noncitizens.84 Therefore, an approach
to immigration enforcement that contemplates these dynamics of equity
theory—and therefore rewards in some way the contributions that
noncitizens make—could avoid such potential outcomes.
A final bundle of theories, related to equity theory, are those relating
to rational choice. These theories posit that individuals make decisions
regarding civic or political participation based on their rational selfinterest.85 Therefore, when choosing to work with or on behalf of the
government, individuals will assess how it benefits them, economically or
otherwise, and will seek to ensure that the benefits outweigh any costs.86
Rational choice theorists have appropriately problematized the concept of
“self-interest,” emphasizing the different imperatives and values that drive
individual decision-making.87 Despite its inherent complexity, rational
choice theory is a helpful frame for understanding the behavior of
noncitizens.88 In many respects, it is similar to equity theory’s
examination of inputs and outcomes, but with a specific focus on
individuals’ engagement with governmental or political processes. Since
the government relies heavily on cooperation by persons within the
country’s territory—including noncitizens—rational choice theory
instructs us to assess the factors that will motivate individuals to cooperate.
It is critical to examine how immigration enforcement dynamics shape
noncitizens’ willingness to assist the government. Currently, the U.S.
government relies on noncitizens for cooperation on a range of matters,
from everyday interactions to high-stakes law enforcement and national
security efforts. Through the T and U nonimmigrant visa programs, for
example, the U.S. government has sought to incentivize reporting and
cooperation regarding criminal activity, with the eventual reward being
the possibility of legal status in the United States.89 Noncitizens support
many other government functions, including military operations and the
84. See Audrey Singer, Brookings Institute, Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Force (Mar. 15, 2012),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0315_immigrant_workers_singer.pdf
(analyzing U.S. dependence on an immigrant labor force).
85. See Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd, & Paul Whiteley, Citizenship & Civic Engagement:
Attitudes and Behaviour in Britain, 51 POL. STUD. 443, 443–44 (2003).
86. Cf. Jan E. Leighley, Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political
Participation, 48 POL. RES. Q. 181, 192 (1995) (discussing the rationality of participation in the
political arena and voter turnouts).
87. DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 18–19 (1994).
88. See, e.g., Sonja Haug, Migration Networks and Migration Decision-Making, 34 J. ETHNIC &
MIGRATION STUD. 585, 586–88 (2008).
89. See infra notes 106–11 and accompanying text.
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work of administrative agencies.90 Affirmative incentives are likely to
yield greater contributions, particularly when they include a means to
remain in the United States. Conversely, if noncitizens learn that their
contributions will have no effect on their ability to remain in the United
States, such contributions may decline. And what if the contributions or
other assistance make removal more likely? That will almost certainly
lead to a decrease in cooperation among noncitizens. A rationallythinking, self-interested actor is unlikely to take such a risk. This suggests
that for states to continue to benefit from different kinds of contributions
by noncitizens, some basic incentives must be in place for the noncitizen.
At a minimum, the noncitizen must have a guarantee that their assistance
will not ultimately harm them. Since these contributions are critical for
the government, equity theory and rational choice theory instruct us that
rewarding contributions in discretionary immigration enforcement
decisions is ultimately beneficial to the United States.
III. BUILDING EQUITY INTO CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
We suggest that two types of contributions by noncitizens should be
given significant consideration in the context of immigration enforcement
decisions. An explication of these categories of contributions and the
theories justifying them as an important equity are detailed below. In
Section A, we define the two categories—(1) sustained economic, social,
and cultural contributions; and (2) substantial and/or sustained
contributions that support the government—and provide specific
examples within each category. These are summarized in Table 1, below.
In Section B, we discuss how criminalization, in three specific forms,
affects the weight given to these positive equities, as well as the current
administration’s shift such that some contributions, which were once
considered positive equities, become tainted with labels of criminality.

90. See infra notes 112–26 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 1: Typology of Contributions and Theoretical Justifications
Type of
Contribution

Example

Theoretical
Justifications

Sustained economic, social, or
cultural contributions to families,
communities, or society at large,
but that do not affirmatively or
indirectly support government
functions
Engaging in low-wage work;
providing economic and other
support for family members,
including U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents
(LPRs); other forms of sustained
community service and
engagement
Modified jus nexi (jus nexi et
contributionum); moral
imperatives

Substantial and/or
sustained
contributions that
support a government
function, either
indirectly or directly
Reporting a crime to
law enforcement;
reporting workplace
violations; serving as
an Office of Refugee
Resettlement sponsor
for an unaccompanied
minor; military service
Modified jus nexi;
moral imperatives;
plus equity theory and
rational choice theory

A. Types of Contributions
This article focuses on two categories of contributions: sustained
economic, social, and cultural contributions that benefit families,
communities, and society at large; and sustained and/or substantial
contributions that support government functions. The purpose of creating
the two categories is to distinguish sustained, yet commonplace,
contributions, such as participation in the workforce or provision of
financial and other support to one’s family, from those contributions that
assist the government, whether directly or indirectly. As noted above,
while there is somewhat limited existing guidance on contributions that
should receive positive weight in immigration enforcement decisions, the
previously articulated guidelines do roughly track these two categories.91
This section endeavors to articulate with more specificity, by way of
concrete examples, the types of contributions by noncitizens that decisionmakers should consider. The examples that follow are not meant to be

91. See supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text.
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exhaustive; rather, they illustrate just a few of the many contributions
made by noncitizens that fall into these categories.
The economic, social, and cultural contributions contemplated by the
first category encompass a wide range of activities and actions. The
category is framed explicitly to include cultural contributions, since
existing immigration law provisions already reward economic, and to a
lesser extent, social contributions. For example, under existing law, some
noncitizens in removal proceedings may apply for a limited form of relief
called cancellation of removal, which is available to both LPRs and others
with long-term presence in the country.92 For LPRs, positive equities for
cancellation include history of employment, business or property ties, and
service to the community, among others.93 Applicants who are not LPRs
face more burdensome requirements and must show, among other things,
“exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the [applicant’s] spouse,
parent, or child, who is a [U.S. citizen] or [LPR].”94 While this is a very
high standard, it recognizes contributions made to immediate family
members, including financial and emotional support.95 Along these lines,
the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program attached
value to educational credentials,96 which is arguably a predicate to broader
economic and social contributions.97
This category endeavors to capture an even broader range of
economic, social, and cultural contributions, beyond those currently
recognized under immigration law. For example, although the non-LPR
cancellation factors recognize caretaking and support as important
92. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2012) (detailing the requirements for cancellation of removal for
permanent and nonpermanent residents).
93. In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (B.I.A. 1998).
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
95. See In re Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467, 471 (B.I.A. 2002) (concluding that the respondent
met the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard because she was the sole provider for
six children, four of whom were U.S. citizens, and she had no family in Mexico).
96. Although the DACA program has since been terminated, USCIS electronically maintains the
information. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/archive/consideration-deferred-action-childhood-arrivalsdaca#guidelines (last updated Feb. 14, 2018) (listing the qualifications for DACA, including that an
applicant must either currently be in school, have graduated high school, obtained a GED, or been
honorably discharged from the Armed Forces of the United States).
97. In holding that the state could not refuse to provide public education to undocumented
children, the Supreme Court stated,
[E]ducation provides the basic tools by which individuals might lead economically
productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum, education has a fundamental role in
maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the significant social costs borne
by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the values and skills upon
which our social order rests.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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contributions, the circumstances need not rise to the level of exceptional
and extremely unusual hardship to count as a positive equity.98 Other
relevant social and cultural contributions may include sustained volunteer
work on a child’s parent-teacher association, running a business that
provides space for community events, or creating impactful art. Many
undocumented immigrants have demonstrated leadership as advocates and
organizers for immigration-related issues; these activists have advocated
publicly on behalf of themselves and others, despite fears of being targeted
and prosecuted for deportation.99 Some noncitizens contribute to other
causes, including those that affect youth and LGBT rights.100 Other
contributions may be even less apparent—take the example of a wellknown subway performer, who provides joy to daily commuters. This
type of contribution rarely receives formal recognition, yet it still can have
a significant cultural and social impact. While this impact can be difficult
to quantify in terms of its economic value, this category of contributions
seeks to look beyond traditional metrics of worthiness.
The category is defined to include only sustained contributions, as the
duration of the contribution is critical to consider. Immigration law has
already signaled the importance of lasting contributions, as reflected in
requirements for continuous periods of presence (typically, five or ten
years) for some forms of relief.101 Because this approach requires a more
case-specific assessment of various equities, one way to factor in duration
is to give more weight to the contribution for each year it is made or
maintained. That said, in evaluating contributions made by a noncitizen,
a minimum duration should not necessarily be required. This model for
decision-making emphasizes individualized evaluations of equities, so the
duration need not be identical in each case.
98. See In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56, 58–63 (B.I.A. 2001) (explaining the
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard for non-LPR cancellation of removal).
99. Allegra M. McLeod, Immigration, Criminalization, and Disobedience, 70 U. MIAMI L. REV.
556, 570–81 (2016) (detailing political actions led by undocumented youth organizers). Early in 2018,
several prominent undocumented activists were targeted by immigration enforcement. See, e.g., Amy
Gottlieb, ICE Detained My Husband for Being an Activist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/18/opinion/ravi-ragbir-immigration-ice.html;
Nina
Shapiro,
Activist Maru Mora-Villalpando Says ICE Using Deportation Threat as ‘Intimidation Tactic,’
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/activist-maru-moravillalpando-says-ice-using-her-deportation-as-intimidation-tactic/.
100. Alan Pelaez Lopez, 10 (Un)documented Black and LGBTQIA+ Activists You Need to Know,
BGD BLOG (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.bgdblog.org/2016/03/10-undocumented-black-and-lgbtqiaactivists-you-need-to-know/.
101. For example, cancellation of removal for non-LPRs requires ten years of continuous presence
in the United States, while cancellation for LPRs requires only seven years of continuous residence.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a), (b) (2012). To obtain citizenship, one must first be a LPR for a period of five
years prior to applying for naturalization. Id. § 1427(a).
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The broader impact of the contribution must also be considered.
Again, looking to cancellation of removal for non-LPRs, under existing
law, only hardship to U.S. citizen or permanent resident children, spouses,
or parents is considered.102 When determining the weight afforded to
contributions, however, the status of the beneficiary should not be
relevant. Activists who work for social change on behalf of a community
benefit many, even though the beneficiaries may be neither immediate
family members nor U.S. citizens or LPRs. For example, DACA
recipients and other DREAMers who have become politically active may
work primarily on behalf of the undocumented community.103 That
sustained social contribution should nonetheless be weighed as a positive
equity. While adjudicators may be reluctant to consider contributions that
benefit undocumented immigrants, those beneficiaries form a substantial
part of the overall community and many have lived in the country for
years.104 In examining the broader context and impact of the contribution,
it is important to consider equity theory, one of the theoretical
underpinnings of jus nexi et contributionum. In order to incentivize
specific contributions, or inputs, that benefit the broader community, the
state must recognize the value of these contributions.
The second category of contributions is distinguishable from the first,
as this set of substantial and/or sustained contributions supports
government functions, either directly or indirectly. Similar to the first
category, the quantum of the contribution, as measured by its weightiness
or duration, is a key factor. Some of these contributions are already built
into immigration law, as the government has recognized the importance of
encouraging noncitizens to make such contributions.105
For example, reporting specific criminal activity and assisting with
prosecutions is a contribution that has been recognized in immigration law.
The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 (VTVPA)
made immigrant victims of specific categories of crimes eligible to receive

102. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
103. See Tania A. Unzueta Carrasco & Hinda Seif, Disrupting the Dream: Undocumented Youth
Reframe Citizenship and Deportability Through Anti-Deportation Activism, 12 LATINO STUD. 279,
289–92 (2014) (describing how undocumented youth have led efforts to combat deportations).
104. U.S. Unauthorized Immigration Population Estimates, PEW RES. CTR.: HISPANIC TRENDS
(Nov. 3, 2016), http://www.pewhispanic.org/interactives/unauthorized-immigrants/; see also Jeffrey
S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, As Mexican Share Declined, U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Population Fell
in 2015 Below Recession Level, PEW RES. CTR.: FACT TANK (Apr. 25, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/04/25/as-mexican-share-declined-u-s-unauthorizedimmigrant-population-fell-in-2015-below-recession-level/ (stating that the undocumented population
declined slightly from 11.3 million in 2009 to 11 million in 2015).
105. See supra Section II.A.
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a U visa.106 In order to receive the U visa, these victims must submit a law
enforcement certification signed by a law enforcement agency, judge, or
prosecutor that affirms that the recipient and crime victim assisted in the
investigation of the crime.107 In other words, the U visa was designed to
incentivize noncitizens to report criminal activity, and to support
investigative and prosecutorial efforts.108 Since the VTVPA of 2000,
subsequent legislation expanded the list of qualifying crimes that make
immigrant victims eligible for a U visa.109 Similarly, the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) provides that victims of trafficking may
be eligible to receive a T visa.110 Like the U visa, the purpose of the T visa
is to facilitate reporting of trafficking incidents and criminal investigations
of alleged misconduct.111
Another clear example of a contribution that directly aids in a
government function is military service. Military service has been
106. Violence Against Women Act of 2000 (VTVPA), Pub. L. No. 106–386, § 1513, 114 Stat.
1464, 1533–1537 (2000).
107. The exact language of the statute requires that
the alien (or in the case of an alien child under the age of 16, the parent, guardian, or next
friend of the alien) has been helpful, is being helpful, or is likely to be helpful to a Federal,
State, or local law enforcement official, to a Federal, State, or local prosecutor, to a Federal
or State judge, to the Service, or to other Federal, State, or local authorities investigating
or prosecuting criminal activity. . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III) (2012).
108. See Victims of Criminal Activity: U Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/victims-human-trafficking-other-crimes/victims-crimi
nal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status/victims-criminal-activity-u-nonimmigrant-status (last updated
Aug. 25, 2017) (“The legislation was intended to strengthen the ability of law enforcement agencies
to investigate and prosecute cases of domestic violence, sexual assault, trafficking of aliens and other
crimes, while also protecting victims of crimes who have suffered substantial mental or physical abuse
due to the crime and are willing to help law enforcement authorities in the investigation or prosecution
of the criminal activity.”).
109. See, e.g., Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub L. No. 113–4, §§ 801,
1222, 127 Stat. 54, 110, 144; see also Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. on
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013: Changes to U Nonimmigrant Status and
Adjustment of State Provisions 2–3 (Apr. 15, 2015), https://www.uscis.gov/site
s/default/files/files/nativedocuments/2015-0415-TVPRA-2013-PM.pdf (explaining that stalking and
fraud in foreign labor contracting were added in the VAWA 2013 and listing the qualifying crimes for
U nonimmigrant status).
110. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–386, § 107(e)(1), 114 Stat.
1464, 1477–78 (2000). Among other T Visa requirements, a person must be a victim of a “severe
form of trafficking,” which is defined as either “sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is
induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not
attained 18 years of age” or “the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection
to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery.” Id. at § 103(8).
111. See 22 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (2012) (stating the purpose of the TVPA is “to combat trafficking
in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are predominantly women and
children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, and to protect their victims”).
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recognized as a positive equity in immigration proceedings, and it has
provided an expedited path to citizenship.112 One recruitment program,
known as the Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI)
program, allowed noncitizens with specific abilities, such as physicians,
nurses, and foreign language experts to enroll in the U.S. military.113 The
program was in place through September 30, 2016.114 The current
administration did not explicitly continue the program, and instead,
reportedly cancelled recruitment contracts for noncitizen recruits.115 In the
fall of 2017, the Pentagon announced policy changes for recruiting
noncitizens to the military, including additional security screening
measures for LPRs and an extended period of time in active service for
foreign nationals.116
Other types of contributions in this category indirectly support a
government function. One such example is the assistance that noncitizens
provide as “sponsors” for unaccompanied minors117 who find themselves
in government custody. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred
functions related to placement and care of unaccompanied minors to the
Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR).118 ORR is responsible for
coordinating the care and placement of unaccompanied minors, taking into
account the best interests of the child.119 In coordination with ORR,
sponsors for unaccompanied minors agree to shepherd the child through
the court process and to ensure that he or she appears at each hearing
before the immigration judge.120 Many sponsors for unaccompanied
112. See Cathy Ho Hartsfield, Note, Deportation of Veterans: The Silent Battle for Naturalization,
64 RUTGERS L. REV. 835, 844–46 (2012) (detailing the steps noncitizens who serve in the military
must take to naturalize and the challenges they face in doing so).
113. Military Accessions Vital to National Interest (MAVNI) Recruitment Pilot Program, U.S.
DEP’T DEF., https://www.defense.gov/news/mavni-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2018).
114. Broadcast Message from U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t Serv., to All Student & Exch.
Visitor Info. Sys. Users, on MAVNI Program Status for Fiscal Year 2017, 1 (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/sevis/pdf/bcm-1612-02.pdf.
115. Alex Horton, U.S. Army Kills Contracts for Hundreds of Immigrant Recruits. Some Face
Deportation, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoin
t/wp/2017/09/15/army-kills-contracts-for-hundreds-of-immigrant-recruits-sources-say-some-facedeportation/?utm_term=.ce7d4e9129ff.
116. Press Release from U.S. Dep’t of Def. on DoD Announces Policy Changes to Lawful
Permanent Residents and the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest (MAVNI) Pilot
Program (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Ar
ticle/1342317/dod-announces-policy-changes-to-lawful-permanent-residents-and-the-military-acc/.
117. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (2012) (defining an unaccompanied minor, or “unaccompanied
alien child,” as a child under the age of 18 who has no lawful immigration status and no parent or legal
guardian either in the United States or available to provide care and physical custody).
118. Id. § 279.
119. Id.
120. See Unaccompanied Children Program: ORR/DCS Family Reunification Packet for
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minors are noncitizens, as lawful immigration status is not a requirement
for serving as a sponsor.121 Beginning in 2014, these sponsors, or care
providers, were required to disclose their immigration status as part of
their application for sponsorship.122
Reporting a danger in the workplace is another contribution that
indirectly supports a government function, as it is analogous to reporting
crimes to law enforcement; it helps worksite enforcement agencies
monitor compliance and can trigger investigations of potentially
dangerous work environments.123 Encouraging workers to report
occupational hazards is one important way to achieve workplace safety.124
Even workers who seek workers’ compensation for occupational injuries
indirectly benefit workplace safety, as they put on the record specific
workplace danger(s) that others may encounter.125 This contribution made
Sponsors, Sponsor Care Agreement, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE REFUGEE
RESETTLEMENT (Aug. 9, 2012), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/unaccompanied-childrensservices (detailing the duties of a sponsor of an unaccompanied minor released from ORR, including
“provid[ing] for the physical and mental well-being of the minor” and “ensur[ing] the minor’s presence
at all future proceedings before the DHS/Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the
DOJ/EOIR”).
121. See SARAH PIERCE, Unaccompanied Child Migrants in U.S. Communities, Immigration
1,
Court,
and
Schools,
2015
MIGRATION POL’Y INST. POL’Y BRIEF, at
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/unaccompanied-child-migrants-us-communitiesimmigration-court-and-schools (stating that unaccompanied children are placed with sponsors who
live in areas with high foreign-born populations); Children Entering the United States
Unaccompanied: Section 2: Safe and Timely Release from ORR Care, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.: OFFICE REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/resource/children-enteringthe-united-states-unaccompanied-section-2#2.1 (last reviewed Dec. 4, 2017) (explaining requirements
for sponsorship).
122. See Sponsors and Placement: Release of Unaccompanied Alien Children to Sponsors in the
U.S., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.: OFFICE REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT,
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/about/ucs/sponsors (last reviewed June 30, 2017) (“In this determination
process, immigration status information is requested of sponsors, and also may emerge through the
background checks. Since January 2014, care providers have been required to enter this information
into the ORR portal, a procedure that was optional until that time. Immigration status information,
however, is not used to disqualify potential sponsors. Instead, it is used to ensure the safety and wellbeing of the child by making sure that there is an adequate care plan in place that takes all relevant
aspects of the sponsor’s situation into consideration.”).
123. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA FACT SHEET:
OSHA
INSPECTIONS
(2016),
https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheetinspections.pdf (noting that worker complaints of hazardous or dangerous conditions are given “high
priority” in allocating inspection resources).
124. Among other goals, two stated purposes for the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
are: “encouraging employers and employees in their efforts to reduce the number of occupational
safety and health hazards at their places of employment, and to stimulate employers and employees to
institute new and to perfect existing programs for providing safe and healthful working conditions”
and “providing for appropriate reporting procedures with respect to occupational safety and health
which procedures will help achieve the objectives of this chapter and accurately describe the nature of
the occupational safety and health problem.” 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1), (12).
125. See Jayesh M. Rathod, Immigrant Labor and the Occupational Safety and Health Regime,
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by immigrant workers is especially important, because many immigrant
workers, particularly those who are undocumented, labor in positions that
have high rates of occupational injury.126
Having examined the contours of these two categories of
contributions—(1) sustained social, cultural and economic contributions,
and (2) sustained and/or substantial contributions that support a
government function, either directly or indirectly—the next section
describes how criminalization taints both categories of contributions.
Criminalization of the latter category is a relatively new phenomenon and
is especially problematic. As discussed in more detail, some contributions
have received affirmative recognition in immigration law and lead to relief
or a path to citizenship; yet in some instances, the noncitizens who should
be rewarded for making such contributions instead face criminal or
immigration-related consequences. The most troubling scenario is one in
which the contribution is itself criminalized, sometimes indirectly, thus
flipping what should be a positive equity to a negative one.
B. Shrinking Equities through Criminalization
Over the past few decades, immigration discretion evolved such that
criminal history has become a primary factor for denying various forms of
immigration relief.127 In the current climate, the limited spaces where
contributions can be considered are themselves being tainted by
criminalization.128 The effect is to narrow even further the opportunities

33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 479, 540 (2009) (suggesting that state workers’ compensation
records may serve as useful data for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to
track injuries and illnesses in the workplace).
126. See id. at 490–97 (2009) (examining specific industries with high rates of occupational
fatalities and injuries that also have high rates of employment of undocumented workers).
127. See Cade, supra note 25, at 663–64 (2015) (noting that in the late twentieth century,
“amendments to the immigration code heralded the rise of criminal history, very broadly defined, as
the primary marker of undesirability, while squeezing consideration of humanitarian or fairness
concerns almost completely out of the adjudicative stages of deportation or criminal proceedings”).
One concrete example is that noncitizens are barred from seeking asylum if they have been convicted
of a particularly serious crime. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2012).
128. As described more fully below, these “spaces” correspond to portions of substantive law that
allow for the exercise of discretion. But the current administration has also altered the physical terrain
of enforcement. Under President Trump, the DHS has prioritized interior enforcement over arrests at
the border, which in effect targets individuals who have resided in the United States for some period
of time. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ICE ENFORCEMENT AND
REMOVAL OPERATIONS REPORT 11 (2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Report/2017/iceEndOfYearFY2017.pdf (stating that an increased emphasis on interior enforcement
led to the highest number of ICE administrative arrests in the past three years); Kristen Bialik, ICE
Arrests Went Up in 2017, With Biggest Increases in Florida, Northern Texas, Oklahoma, PEW RES.
CTR.: FACT TANK (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/02/08/ice-arrests-wentup-in-2017-with-biggest-increases-in-florida-northern-texas-oklahoma/.
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for noncitizens to seek relief or a reprieve from removal. The table below
defines three different forms of criminalization that impact noncitizens:
(1) direct criminalization of contributions; (2) indirect criminalization of
contributions; and (3) separate criminal activity that dilutes the positive
impact of contributions. These three forms of criminalization have begun
to change how contributions are framed, and thus how equities are
weighed in the context of discretionary enforcement decisions.
TABLE 2: Forms of Criminalization that Impact Noncitizens and their
Contributions
Type of
Definition
Examples: sustained
Examples:
criminalization
economic, social, and
support of
cultural contributions government
functions
Direct
The very act
Laws that seek to
N/A
criminalization that could be
criminalize the act of
framed as a
seeking/soliciting work
contribution is
by unauthorized
criminalized
persons
Indirect
Corollary or
Prosecutions for use of Reporting labor
criminalization predicate acts
false documents to
violations is
are
obtain employment;
criminalized
criminalized;
criminalization that
through
or,
circumscribes mobility perversion of
criminalization or visibility (and hence insurance rules;
generates
inhibits societal
ORR sponsors
conditions that
engagement), such as
are criminalized
make the act
state-specific driver’s
for the related
impossible
license restrictions
act of facilitating
based on immigration
the unlawful
status
entry of children
Separate
Separate
Any kind of criminal
Any kind of
criminal
behavior,
activity
criminal activity
activity
unrelated or
loosely related
to a specific
contribution,
that overrides
the importance
of the
contribution
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In examining how contributions should be weighed vis-à-vis criminal
conduct, it is important to distinguish status-based criminalization from
conduct-based criminalization. Status-based criminalization is an effort to
make certain acts that are directly related to one’s immigration status
criminal. Due to federal preemption129 and the plenary power of the
federal government over immigration law,130 federal laws control the
domain of criminal immigration offenses. As discussed in more detail
below, however, some states have avoided direct criminalization based on
one’s status and instead have criminalized specific actions taken, out of
necessity, by individuals with a certain status, particularly those who are
undocumented.131 Conduct-based criminalization is based on the conduct
itself, regardless of one’s status. These distinctions become blurred when
laws appear to target conduct, but instead clearly criminalize individuals
based on immigration status.
1. Direct Criminalization
At present, forms of direct criminalization of contributions are very
limited. In theory, the government could directly criminalize a
contribution if it chose to criminalize work by noncitizens who lack
employment authorization. Currently, the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)132 imposes civil penalties for employers who
hire or recruit noncitizens who are known to be unauthorized.133
Employers that show a pattern and practice of employing unauthorized
immigrants may even face criminal penalties.134 Yet employees who work
without documentation do not face IRCA penalties, unless they
affirmatively present fraudulent documents.135 Should legislators decide
to change the law, it would represent a form of direct criminalization of a
contribution, notwithstanding the economic and broader societal
contributions that flow from employment. Some jurisdictions have
attempted to criminalize the solicitation of work through local
129. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 416 (2012) (holding that specific sections of
Arizona’s SB 1070, which sought to criminalize noncitizens who work without authorization and to
permit state officers greater authority to arrest noncitizens who may be removable, were preempted
by federal law).
130. See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 728 (1893) (articulating the
federal government’s broad power over deportation and exclusion of noncitizens).
131. See infra Section III.B.2.
132. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160, 1187–1188, 1255a, 1324–1324b, 1264–1265 (2012).
133. Id. § 1324a(a)(1)–(2) (making it unlawful to hire, recruit, or continue to employ a worker
without authorization to work in the United States).
134. Id. § 1324a(f).
135. Id. § 1324c(a).
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ordinances,136 though such laws are often struck down as unconstitutional
on first amendment or federal preemption grounds.137 Though few have
survived, these laws represent an effort to directly criminalize a sustained
everyday contribution.
2. Indirect Criminalization
Contributions that are indirectly criminalized or that result in certain
immigration consequences are much more common and can be just as
devastating as direct criminalization. Unlike direct criminalization,
indirect forms are sometimes less apparent, particularly to those
individuals who may be affected, and are therefore more insidious. This
section offers examples of the indirect criminalization of contributions.
Some of the sustained contributions described above are indirectly
criminalized at the federal and/or state levels.
Status-based
criminalization related to workplace contributions is one such example.
While federal law imposes sanctions only against the employer for hiring
unauthorized workers,138 workers are nonetheless targeted for the use of
false documents. One notorious example is the Postville raids that
occurred in 2008. As detailed by Ingrid Eagly, the enforcement operation
at the meatpacking plant in Iowa led to one of the largest immigration
criminal prosecutions in history.139 Facing threats of federal prosecution
for aggravated identity theft, most workers “pleaded guilty to [the] false
use of a document as evidence of authorized employment.”140 Eagly
argues that the Postville raids are “emblematic of the blending of our
criminal and immigration systems.”141 These raids also illustrate one
136. See generally Kristina M. Campbell, The High Cost of Free Speech: Anti-Solicitation
Ordinances, Day Laborers, and the Impact of “Backdoor” Local Immigration Regulations, 25 GEO.
IMM. L.J. 1, 4–20 (2010) (describing numerous anti-solicitation ordinances targeted at immigrant day
laborers, and related litigation responses); Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal”
Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do
About It, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6–8 (2007) (detailing the rise of immigration-related local ordinances,
particularly those regulating employment, in 2006 and 2007).
137. See State v. Garcia, 401 P.3d 588, 599 (Kan. 2017) (“States are prohibited from using the I–
9 and any information contained within the I–9 as the bases for a state law identity theft prosecution
of an alien who uses another’s Social Security information in an I–9.”) (emphasis in original) petition
for cert. docketed, Kansas v. Ramiro-Garcia (Dec. 11, 2017) (No. 17-834); Centro de la Comunidad
Hispana de Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 128 F. Supp. 3d 597, 620–21 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)
(holding that a local ordinance that targeted day laborers soliciting work was unconstitutional under
the First Amendment).
138. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)–(2).
139. Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281, 1301 (2010).
140. Id. at 1302.
141. Id. at 1304.
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example of indirect federal criminalization of an everyday contribution,
specifically contributions to the labor force, by targeting the predicate act
of providing false documents.
Similarly, some states have used identity theft laws as a way to
prosecute noncitizens who use false identities to obtain employment.142
As noted by Jennifer Chacón, Arizona’s identity theft statute, which in
effect targets unauthorized workers, “does not require theft of an actual
identity, [and] can be deployed as a means of prosecuting noncitizens who
have used false identities to obtain employment in cases where there is no
loss to anyone as a result of the use of that identity.”143 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that the statute was not federally preempted in its
entirety.144 The district court later issued an order enjoining the Maricopa
County Sheriff from using certain documents, such as a Form I-9, for the
purpose of prosecuting identity theft.145
Another example of indirect criminalization seen nationwide is the
enforcement of driving infractions against immigrant communities,
specifically driving without a license. For many people, noncitizens and
citizens alike, the ability to drive is a necessary predicate to employment,
interaction with the community, and support for one’s family. Yet, only a
small number of states have enacted laws that make it possible to obtain a

142. See Leticia M. Saucedo, The Making of the “Wrongfully” Documented Worker, 93 N.C. L.
Rev. 1505, 1530 (2015) (“Over the past decade or so, states have enacted or amended identity
theft statutes to criminalize the false use of Social Security numbers or other identifying information
for employment. Such laws are ostensibly and sometimes explicitly aimed at reserving jobs for the
native-born, majority-white populations in those states.”).
143. Chacón, supra note 40, at 138. The statute states:
A person commits taking the identity of another person or entity if the person knowingly
takes, purchases, manufactures, records, possesses or uses any personal identifying
information or entity identifying information of another person or entity, including a real
or fictitious person or entity, without the consent of that other person or entity, with the
intent to obtain or use the other person’s or entity’s identity for any unlawful purpose or to
cause loss to a person or entity whether or not the person or entity actually suffers any
economic loss as a result of the offense, or with the intent to obtain or continue
employment.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2008(A) (West 2018).
144. See Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, 821 F.3d 1098, 1110 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing the district
court’s grant of the preliminary injunction after concluding that Arizona’s employment-related identity
theft laws were not preempted in all applications).
145. Puente Arizona v. Arpaio, No. CV-14-01356-PHX-DGC, 2017 WL 1133012, at *17 (D.
Ariz. Mar. 27, 2017) (holding that the defendants’ use of the I-9 forms for state identity theft
prosecutions was preempted under federal law and granting the requested preliminary injunction such
that the Maricopa County Sheriff could no longer rely on the Form I-9 for purposes of investigating
or prosecuting violations of the state identity theft statute); see also I-9, Employment Eligibility
Verification, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9 (last updated July 17, 2017)
(describing information pertaining to the I-9 form).
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driver’s license regardless of immigration status.146 The majority of states
require both proof of identity and legal presence in the United States.147 In
Virginia, for example, the specific categories of documents required to
show legal presence create barriers to obtain a driver’s license for even
noncitizens who have received immigration relief.148
Thus, for
undocumented immigrants and other noncitizens, driving with a license is
not a choice in their state; their status makes obtaining a license
impossible, rendering them vulnerable to criminal charges. Not only does
the criminalization of this act make noncitizens vulnerable to increased
interactions with the criminal justice system, it also makes their ability to
achieve some of the contributions discussed herein nearly impossible.
While these examples of indirect criminalization are alarming, this
pattern has been apparent for well over a decade.149 What has expanded
significantly under the current administration is the indirect
criminalization of the second category of contributions—those that
support government functions. For example, a memorandum issued by
John Kelly, then-Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), states that the administration will prioritize specific ORR sponsors
for removal and possible prosecution.150 Not only does this directly
146. The National Immigration Law Center (NILC) compiled a list of the fourteen jurisdictions
that permitted state residents to get a driver’s license regardless of immigration status. NAT’L
IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., STATE LAWS PROVIDING ACCESS TO DRIVER’S LICENSES OR CARDS,
REGARDLESS OF IMMIGRATION STATUS (May 2017), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uplo
ads/2015/11/drivers-license-access-table.pdf. Indeed, some states even prohibit giving driver’s
licenses to those who have some form of legal status. Id.
147. See Adam Hunter & Angelo Mathay, Driver’s Licenses for Unauthorized Immigrants: 2016
Highlights, PEW CHARITABLE TR. (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/ research-andanalysis/analysis/2016/11/22/drivers-licenses-for-unauthorized-immigrants-2016-highlights (finding
that as of November 2016, only twelve states and the District of Columbia allow unauthorized
immigrants to obtain a driver’s license or card).
148. See Obtaining a Virginia Driver’s License or Identification (ID) Card, VA. DEP’T MOTOR
VEHICLES (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.dmv.virginia.gov/webdoc/pdf/dmv141.pdf (listing the
accepted documents to show legal presence in the United States).
149. See, e.g., Annie Lai, Confronting Proxy Criminalization, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 879, 889–92
(2015) (noting that restrictions on immigrants’ access to driver’s licenses can be traced back to the
1990s).
150. Memorandum from John Kelly, Sec’y of Homeland Sec. to Kevin McAleenan, Acting
Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Thomas D. Homan, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs
Enf’t, Lori Scialabba, Acting Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Joseph B. Maher, Acting
Gen. Counsel, Dimple Shah, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Int’l Affairs, Chip Fulghum, Acting
Undersecretary for Mgmt., on Implementing the President’s Border Security and Immigration
Enforcement
Improvements
Policies
11
(Feb.
20,
2017),
https://www.dhs.go
v/sites/default/files/publications/17_0220_S1_Implementing-the-Presidents-Border-Security-Immig
ration-Enforcement-Improvement-Policies.pdf (“Although the Department’s personnel must process
unaccompanied alien children pursuant to the requirements described above, we have an obligation to
ensure that those who conspire to violate our immigration laws do not do so with impunity—
particularly in light of the unique vulnerabilities of alien children who are smuggled or trafficked into
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conflict with ORR guidance,151 it criminalizes a specific category of
sponsors—undocumented parents. On the surface, criminalization of
ORR sponsors appears to be conduct-based criminalization; according to
the DHS, these sponsors paid someone to bring their children to the United
States.152 These caretakers, however, would not be subjected to scrutiny
if they were not made to register with ORR, resulting in the disclosure of
their status to other government agencies. Thus, while this policy appears
to be based on one’s conduct, the capacity to target these specific
caretakers is based on their immigration status.
Furthermore, undocumented parents or relatives living in the United
States typically have no lawful pathway to bring their children to the
country.153 Consequently, because of the limitations that accompany their
own status, undocumented parents are forced to find other ways to reunite
with their children in the United States.154 The February 2017
memorandum does not appear to be an empty threat, as various news
sources have reported arrests of ORR sponsors.155These heightened threats
the United States. . . . Accordingly, the Director of ICE and Commissioner of CBP shall ensure the
proper enforcement of our immigration laws against any individual who—directly or indirectly—
facilitates the illegal smuggling or trafficking of an alien child to the United States.”) [hereinafter Kelly
Memo].
151. Consistent with the Flores Stipulated Settlement, ORR releases unaccompanied minors to
sponsors in order of preference:
parent; legal guardian; an adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent or first
cousin); an adult individual or entity designated by the parent or legal guardian (through a
signed declaration or other document that ORR determines is sufficient to establish the
signatory’s parental/guardian relationship); a licensed program willing to accept legal
custody; or an adult individual or entity seeking custody when it appears that there is no
other likely alternative to long term ORR care and custody.
Children Entering the United States Unaccompanied: Safe and Timely Release from ORR Care, supra
note 121.
152. See Kelly Memo, supra note 150, at 10 (“Most of these minors are from El Salvador,
Honduras, and Guatemala, many of whom travel overland to the southern border with the assistance
of a smuggler who is paid several thousand dollars by one or both parents, who reside illegally in the
United States.”).
153. See Green Card Eligibility Categories, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/greencard/eligibility-categories (last visited Feb. 27, 2018) (specifying the
limited pathways that one can receive permanent residence via a family member).
154. See Nick Miroff, To Curb Illegal Border Crossings, Trump Administration Weighs New
Measures Targeting Families, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingt
onpost.com/world/national-security/to-curb-illegal-border-crossings-trump-administration-weighsnew-measures-targeting-families/2017/12/21/19300dc2-e66c-11e7-9ec2518810e7d44d_story.html?utm_term=.b3d9dd61feae. Indeed, with threats to separate parents from
their children at the border, parents may choose to enter separately from their children. Id.
155. See e.g., John Burnett, ICE Has Arrested More Than 400 in Operation Targeting Parents
Who Pay Smugglers, NPR (Aug. 18, 2017, 4:31 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/08
/18/544523231/arrests-of-undocumented-parents-sparks-debate-between-federal-officials-and-immi;
Caitlin Dickerson, Trump Administration Targets Parents in New Immigration Crackdown, N.Y.
TIMES (July 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/01/us/trump-arrest-undocumented-
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against undocumented sponsors significantly reduce any incentive to
become a sponsor. With only negative outcomes imposed by the state for
sponsorship, undocumented sponsors may be reluctant to step forward,
and unaccompanied minors may be placed in less secure settings.156
At the state level, workers who report and seek compensation for
workplace injuries, and thus indirectly support government efforts to
promote workplace safety, also face potential criminalization. ProPublica
and National Public Radio (NPR) reported that undocumented immigrants
in Florida who filed for workers’ compensation were then targeted for
prosecution for filing a claim using false identification.157 Some were not
aware that a false identification number had been forwarded from the
employer to the insurance company.158 By covering medical expenses,
workers’ compensation certainly benefits the worker who reports the
injury; however, filing a claim also serves to document a workplace safety
issue, as the injury may have resulted from a dangerous condition in the
workplace. In this regard, reporting a workplace safety issue not only
benefits the worker-complainant but also the other workers who may face
the same dangers at that workplace. Yet instead of being encouraged to
report, some undocumented workers face criminal charges for filing for
workers’ compensation. Notably, the reporters found that ninety-nine
percent of the workers arrested under the statute were Latino immigrants
working with false documents.159 These statistics illustrate that this form
of criminalization is status-based. Like sponsors of unaccompanied
minors, a likely effect of the prosecutions will be to chill noncitizen
workers from filing similar claims in the future, thus weakening the overall
integrity of the regulatory apparatus. Rational choice theory instructs us
that workers should have some incentives to file claims, and they must feel
that they are ultimately better off for engaging with the government.160

immigrants.html?mcubz=1; Franco Ordoñez, Trump Administration Targets Parents Who Paid to
Smuggle Children into U.S., MIAMI HERALD (June 29, 2017, 2:38 PM), http://www.miamiherald.
com/latest-news/article158953664.html.
156. Cf. Molly Hennesy-Fiske, Young Immigrants Placed in Sponsor Homes are at Risk of Abuse,
Experts Say, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://beta.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigrantsponsors-20150818-story.html (reporting on the lack of oversight in placing unaccompanied minors
with sponsors living in the United States).
157. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, They Got Hurt at Work. Then They Got Deported.,
PROPUBLICA (Aug. 16, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/they-got-hurt-at-workthen-they-got-deported.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
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3. Separate Criminal Activity
The final category of criminalization includes separate criminal
activity that is not related to a specific contribution, but it may operate to
override the positive impact of the noncitizens’ contributions. Every day,
immigrants who are facing the prospect of removal find themselves before
decision-makers who scrutinize prior criminal activity.161 Given the
insidious associations made between unauthorized migration and
criminality, even relatively minor criminal conduct can outweigh
significant connections and contributions to the United States. For
example, in the context of applications for DACA—which confers simply
a reprieve from removal, and not an affirmative status—applicants with
certain misdemeanor convictions are ineligible to receive the benefit.162
Even contributions that support the government are dampened by
unrelated allegations of criminality, especially in the current political
climate. In the past, applicants who were able to link the criminal conduct
to the underlying victimization were able to move forward with their U or
T visa applications.163 Anecdotally, now however, more applicants for U
or T visas who have a criminal history fear being reported to ICE due to
increased collaboration between immigration enforcement and local law
enforcement.164 Consequently, a contribution that assists an important
government function—investigation and prosecution of crimes—and
provides a path to legal status, has become tainted, thus discouraging
immigrant survivors of violence from fulfilling the very purpose of the
program.165
Noncitizens who have served in the military are also at risk for
deportation due to criminal activity. The contributions of veterans are
overlooked in an immigration system that ignores the context for criminal
conduct and instead categorically denies relief based on specific criminal
convictions.166 As a result of their service, veterans may suffer from
161. See Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1672–73 (2011) (describing how
analysis of criminal convictions has become central to administrative immigration decisions).
162. See Rathod, supra note 30, at 174–76 (describing the criminal bars to eligibility for DACA,
including having a “significant misdemeanor” conviction).
163. See Elizabeth Keyes, Beyond Saints and Sinners: Discretion and the Need for New
Narratives in the U.S. Immigration System, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 228–31 (2012) (explaining the
availability of waivers for applicants for U visas and VAWA cancellation).
164. See e.g., Nora Caplan-Bricker, “I Wish I’d Never Called the Police,” SLATE (Mar. 19, 2017,
8:12
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/cover_story/2017/03/u_visas_gav
e_a_safe_path_to_citizenship_to_victims_of_abuse_under_trump.html.
165. See supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
166. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (2012) (providing the categories of deportable offenses based
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various mental health conditions when returning from war, such as posttraumatic stress disorder, drug addiction, or others, which may lead them
to commit crimes.167 The immigration laws afford little discretionary
leeway for veterans with certain types of criminal convictions, leading to
removal proceedings and even deportations.168 Although the government
does not maintain a record of the number of deported veterans, over 200
cases have been documented, and many of them were deported due to
drug-related convictions.169
The ever-expanding forms of criminalization of both sustained
economic, social, and cultural contributions, and sustained and/or
substantial contributions that support government functions leads to the
expulsion of noncitizens who would otherwise have positive equities in
their favor. Criminalization also impedes one’s ability to make more
substantive contributions. Noncitizens become so afraid they cannot
contribute in ways that will later be rewarded, as demonstrated by
survivors of crime who refuse to report crimes committed against them for
fear of interacting with law enforcement.170 Criminalization prevents
community engagement and undermines potentially positive equities that
serve the broader community and, in some cases, support the government.
The theoretical framework articulated in Section II provides
justification for treating contributions as positive equities and minimizing
the weight afforded to certain criminal acts. 171 Under the modified theory
of jus nexi, or jus nexi et contributionum, both everyday contributions and
contributions that support government functions should be weighed as
positive equities and evidence of one’s connection to society. The sections
on criminal conduct).
167. Hartsfield, supra note 112, at 850.
168. Immigrant Vet Awaits Judge’s Deportation Ruling After Drug Conviction, FOX NEWS (Mar.
7, 2017), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2017/03/07/immigrant-vet-awaits-judges-deportation-rulingafter-drug-conviction.html. Jose Padilla, whose ineffective assistance of counsel claim was appealed
to the Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, is another example. 559 U.S. 356, 359, 374 (2010).
Padilla served as a member of the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam and later faced deportation after
pleading guilty to transporting a large amount of marijuana. Id. at 359.
169. Miriam Jordan, 15 Years After Deportation, Marine Wins Right to Come Back to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/18/us/veteran-deported-pardoned.html
?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=second-columnregion&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0&mtrref=l.facebook.com; Translation – From A
Distance, RADIO AMBULANTE (Nov. 28, 2017), http://radioambulante.org/en/audio-en/
translation/translation-from-a-distance.
170. Jennifer Medina, Too Scared to Report Sexual Abuse. The Fear: Deportation, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/us/immigrants-deportation-sexual-abuse.html;
James Queally, Fearing Deportation, Many Domestic Violence Victims are Steering Clear of Police
and Courts, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-lnundocumented-crime-reporting-20171009-story.html.
171. See supra notes 58–63 and accompanying text.
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above outline some of the contours of these specific contributions,
including the duration and amount of benefit to others.
Equity theory and rational choice theory offer a theoretical
justification for providing a path to membership based on substantial
contributions that support a government function. While some of these
contributions are recognized under immigration law, such as the U or T
visa, the new priorities to target noncitizens with any criminal interaction
threatens U or T visa applicants with deportation based on separate
criminal conduct, thus discouraging noncitizens from coming forward to
report their crimes.172 Despite the purpose of these visa programs, more
noncitizens may fear interacting with local law enforcement, resulting in
fewer reports of crime.173 In their simplest forms, equity and rational
choice theory justify rewarding such contributions that support law
enforcement functions, so as to maintain the incentive to cooperate.
Specifically, for one’s cooperation in an investigation, the applicant
should receive a work permit and a path to lawful status.
C. Weighing both Contributions and Criminal Conduct
Scholars and advocates have distinct views on how to assess criminal
history in weighing equities in the immigration context. Some argue that
when a person has served his or her sentence, he or she should not face
further consequences, especially one as dire as deportation.174 The
Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky recognized the severity of this
collateral consequence when it held that a criminal defense attorney’s
failure to advise a client about the immigration consequences of a criminal
conviction can form the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.175 When one also considers the enormous racial disparities in the
criminal justice system, the use of criminality as a proxy for desirability is
especially problematic. Not only are the racial implications of
criminalization alarming, noncitizens face a form of double punishment
when their conviction possibly leads to deportation.176
172. See Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13768, 82
Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017); supra notes 161, 167, and accompanying text.
173. Rathod, supra note 30, at 174–76.
174. E.g., Maureen Sweeney & Hillary Scholten, Penalty and Proportionality in Deportation for
Crimes, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 11, 36-40 (2011) (arguing that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should
inform a proportionality analysis in deportation based on crime and that categories of criminal
deportations would likely fail to meet this standard).
175. 559 U.S. 356, 374–375 (2011).
176. See Banks, supra note 12, at 1669 (arguing that post-entry crime-based deportation is
punitive).

2018

EQUITY IN CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT

987

Others, including Obama administration officials, have attempted to
draw the line at noncitizens who commit more serious crimes. During his
second term, President Obama emphasized in a speech, “Felons, not
families. Criminals, not children.”177 The reality of deportation under that
administration, however, told a very different story. In practice, those
targeted under federal programs, such as 287(g) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) and the Secure Communities program that allowed
local law enforcement to assist federal immigration enforcement, were
low-level offenders.178 While the Obama administration purported to
follow a set of priorities for enforcement, particularly as it related to
noncitizens with limited or no criminal history, the current administration
has eliminated any priority-setting in this regard and has instead targeted
any noncitizen who has contact with the criminal justice system.179 The
Trump administration even created an office of victim assistance for
crimes committed by immigrants, called Victims of Immigration Crime
Engagement (VOICE).180 The establishment of this office under the
authority of ICE suggests that crimes committed by noncitizens are
somehow more extensive or concerning than those committed by citizens.
As stated on the ICE website, “ICE wants to ensure those victimized by
criminal aliens feel heard, seen and supported.”181 Such a program only
underscores the perceived severity of crimes committed by noncitizens.
Given the rapid convergence of criminal and immigration law, it is
unlikely that criminal conduct, as a negative factor, will disappear
altogether. Indeed, in the current immigration system, criminality seems
to be the ultimate marker of undesirability. Consistent with the focus of
177. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on Immigration,
(Nov. 20, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarkspresident-address-nation-immigration (“Mass amnesty would be unfair. Mass deportation would be
both impossible and contrary to our character. What I’m describing is accountability—a commonsense, middle-ground approach: If you meet the criteria, you can come out of the shadows and get
right with the law. If you’re a criminal, you’ll be deported. If you plan to enter the U.S. illegally, your
chances of getting caught and sent back just went up.”).
178. RANDY CAPPS, ET AL., DELEGATION AND DIVERGENCE: A STUDY OF 287(G) STATE AND
LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
19–21 (Migration Policy Inst., Jan. 2011),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/delegation-and-divergence-287g-state-and-localimmigration-enforcement (finding that in 287(g) jurisdictions that placed immigration detainers on
any noncitizen that the majority of detainees had low-level offenses or traffic violations); see also
supra note 14 and accompanying text.
179. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States, Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed.
Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017) (stating that the enforcement priorities include noncitizens who have been
convicted of any criminal offense, who have been charged with any criminal offense, or who have
committed acts that constitute a chargeable offense).
180. Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement (VOICE) Office, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENF’T, https://www.ice.gov/voice (last updated Sept. 18, 2017).
181. Id.
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this article, however, one potential option to balance the equities in a more
just manner is to consider the context of both the contributions and the
conviction. Criminal conduct that results from conditions created by one’s
significant contribution, such as the case of veterans who commit crimes
as a result of post-traumatic stress disorder, should be viewed in that
context and granted little, if any weight against the noncitizen. Temporal
considerations—namely, the amount of time that has lapsed since the
criminal activity occurred—is another contextual factor. Along these
lines, some scholars have called for a statute of limitations on deportations
triggered by old criminal convictions.182
Another possible dividing marker is status-based versus conductbased criminalization. Many of the contributions that have been
criminalized directly or indirectly are based solely on one’s status, rather
than based on conduct independent of one’s status. Convictions that are
merely status-based, such as driving without a license in a state that does
not permit an undocumented person to obtain a license, should not be
given any weight against the noncitizen. Even at a basic level, entry across
the border is not criminal conduct; rather, it is regulatory and based on
one’s status.183 If the executive and legislative branches continue to use
criminal conduct as a marker for undesirability, which is concerning for
the reasons discussed above, they should at least consider only behavior
that is separate from one’s immigration status.
Regarding conduct-based criminalization, yet another approach, as
mentioned, is to remove criminality as a negative equity altogether. This
is unlikely to happen in the current political climate, given the expanded
efforts to target any noncitizen who interacts with the criminal justice
system.184 An alternative theory is to adopt proportionality in immigration
enforcement, as suggested by other immigration scholars.185 Borrowing
from guidance on punitive damages in civil litigation, as recommended by
Angela Banks, immigration adjudicators may examine three guideposts to
evaluate the proportionality of deportation grounds: (1) consideration of
the enormity of the deportable offense; (2) individualized assessment of
the facts and context giving rise to the criminal conviction; and (3)
182. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 45, at 535–37.
183. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (treating entry without inspection as a ground of
inadmissibility that can lead to removal proceedings); see also id. § 1325 (penalizing any noncitizen
who enters without examination or inspection by an immigration officer with either a fine or
imprisonment up to six months for the first offense and up to two years for subsequent offenses).
184. See supra notes 166–70 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, Judging Immigration Equity: Deportation and Proportionality in
the Supreme Court, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1029 (2017) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
proportionality-influenced jurisprudence).
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availability of other criminal or civil penalties as an indicator of
excessiveness.186 For this final element, the concept of double punishment
would still be relevant, as noncitizens with criminal convictions already
served their sentence when placed in removal proceedings.187
Ultimately, this article suggests that a broad swath of contributions
should be given favorable weight in discretionary enforcement decisions.
It highlights how criminalization can hinder some forms of contributions
and examines how specific contributions can actually lead to
criminalization. It demonstrates that criminalization in immigration law
has become an ever-expanding black hole that needs some limits.
Immigration law must not just be controlled by more procedural
protections, but by reassessing the equities examined by immigration
judges and other government adjudicators, and by distinguishing between
status and conduct-based criminalization.
When applying these
interpretive tools, the contributions described in this article should be
given significant, positive weight in the context of enforcement decisions.
Furthermore, contributions that support government functions either
directly or indirectly should be given greater weight by the state. While
other contributions are no less significant, equity theory more clearly
supports this approach, as noncitizens contribute to state functions and the
state reciprocates by offering the right to remain.
IV. LIMITATIONS & CONCLUSION
The approach suggested in this article—of weighing contributions
made by noncitizens and critically analyzing forms of contributions—is
not without its limitations. Contributions can happen in a myriad of ways,
and some are less easily measured or difficult to define. This article
attempts to broaden what should be considered in weighing positive
equities in the context of enforcement decisions. While economic
contributions are significant, they should not be the singular focus for
relief. Even so, the task of drawing the line at certain types of
contributions and weighing one against another is difficult. Does a
noncitizen who has been active in the community and consistently
supports her family in the United States have more contributions in her
favor than, for example, the beloved immigrant subway performer who
has no dependents? While we suggest some basic guidelines for duration
and who benefits from the contribution, this article does not clearly define
this line. The hope is that it expands the types of contributions that may
186. Banks, supra note 12, at 1677–78.
187. Keyes, supra note 161, at 228–31 and accompanying text.
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be taken into account in determining who deserves to remain in the
country.
One pitfall that an emphasis on contributions seeks to avoid is the
“good” versus “bad” immigrant narrative. This narrative is now
entrenched in the way we speak about immigration reform, both under the
current and prior administrations. The purpose of this article is to blur this
line, as such distinctions are rarely straightforward. Noncitizens with
criminal histories should not be automatically excluded from various
forms of immigration relief. The harsh penalties in the U.S. civil
immigration system for noncitizens with convictions are overly punitive.
As noted above, such a narrative fails to recognize racial injustice and
unfairness inherent in the U.S. criminal justice system. The incorporation
of contributions in this framework should not serve to reinforce this divide
between “good” and “bad” immigrants. Rather, the purpose is to
emphasize that equities should fall on a spectrum and to suggest the types
of contributions that should be considered.
In some cases, the criminalization of contributions is already so deeply
entrenched that immigrants do not perform specific contributions out of
fear for its consequences. For example, noncitizens may choose not to
engage in the community, if it involves driving without a license to
participate. While this article suggests an expansive range of contributions
to consider, we also recognize that the criminalization of immigrant
communities, especially in the current political climate, is so intense that
many noncitizens may choose not to make certain contributions. This is
an inherent limitation of a contributions-focused approach.
Furthermore, the contributions framework overlaps somewhat with a
theory of earned citizenship, as detailed in the work of Shachar and others.
While this theory has positive aspects, there are nonetheless critiques of
this framework. This theory assumes that noncitizens, especially those
who are entered without authorization, start with some moral deficit.188 As
Muneer Ahmad notes, earned citizenship heavily emphasizes economic
performance in its calculus.189 Ahmad argues that an emphasis on earned
citizenship overlooks the structural causes motivating undocumented
immigrants and the marginalization of these immigrants.190 The theory of
examining contributions also faces some of the challenges of earned
citizenship, specifically that noncitizens have to prove their worth to
remain in the United States. However, our approach seeks to remove the
188. Ahmad, supra note 57, at 298 (arguing that earned citizenship reinforces the “immigrant-ascriminal narrative” promoted by immigration restrictionists).
189. Id. at 279.
190. Id. at 264.
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“original sin” of undocumented status and to emphasize the contributions
made in the United States, rather than the circumstances that led to one’s
entry.
Despite these limitations, this article offers another theory for
equitable consideration in immigration law—contributions made by
noncitizens. We offer a broad range of examples that fall into two
categories: (1) sustained economic, social, or cultural contributions to
families, communities, or society at large, but that do not affirmatively or
indirectly support government functions; and (2) substantial and/or
sustained contributions that support government function, either directly
or indirectly. Using theoretical underpinnings, including equity theory,
jus nexi principles, and rational choice theory, we provide justifications
for considering these specific contributions in assessing noncitizens’ right
to remain in the United States.191 Additionally, the article details the
impact of criminalization of immigration law on weighing contributions
and even noncitizens’ ability to make specific contributions.192 The three
categories of direct and indirect criminalization and separate criminal
conduct demonstrate the enormity of the obstacle created by the use of
criminality as a negative equity in enforcement decisions. Even so, we
offer that status-based criminalization, which results merely from
undocumented status, should not be given significant, if any, weight in
evaluating one’s right to remain. Consideration of a broader range of
contributions, in addition to a more context-specific understanding of
criminal conduct, will instill greater equity and fairness into the U.S.
immigration system.

191. Supra notes 159–62 and accompanying text.
192. Supra Section III.B.

